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Narrative and Drama in the American Trial
Robert P. Burns
Northwestern University School of Law
The Trial as a Law Enforcement Device
One influential view of the American trial understands it precisely as an instrument
of law enforcement. I have called this conception “the received view of the trial.” (Burns,
1999: 10-33) Here the trial is the institutional device to incarnate the rule of law where
there are disputes of fact. The “rule of law” is here conceived, as Justice Scalia is fond of
calling it, “a law of rules,” rules which have the higher level of legitimacy that derives
from their democratic pedigree in the constitution or legislature or, in a traditional notion
of the common law, as the slow working out of the requirements of the natural law over
time to produce norms superior to the likely intuitions of a given judge or jury.
Additionally, liberal legality finds it important that these rules be announced before the
action they are to control and that the same rules that were announced ahead of time be the
very same rules that are applied in evaluating those actions. (Hart 1968) This both
enhances the freedom of the citizen and controls the potentially arbitrary behavior of the
“magistrate.” Within the received view of the trial, “the law” exists before the trial begins
and, in a strong sense, can be enforced through the trial’s devices. I have written that one
of the remarkable things about the Anglo-American trial is the extent to which these very
utopian ideals of the rule of law were given very practical shape by the very practical
utopians who were common law lawyers. For example, the doctrine of materiality in
Evidence law provides that no unit of evidence can be received at trial unless it has, as a
matter of a common sense empirical generalization embedded in our “web of belief,” a link
to one of the authoritative legal rules that control the case. Thus, if the applicable landlord-

tenant law provides (as Anglo-American property law traditionally did) that a tenant who
fails to pay her rent may be evicted regardless of whether the apartment fails miserably to
conform to the local building code, then the tenant will be barred from offering evidence of
the condition of her apartment in an eviction trial. To admit such evidence would be to
tempt the jury to reach beyond the authoritative norm and decide the case based on its own
sense of justice, an affront to the rule of law as a law of rules. (Evidence law is more
important in Anglo-American legal regimes than in Continental because of both the
centrality of the jury and because of the adversary parties’ control over the presentation of
evidence.)

So the trial’s rules and structure were designed to protect the rule of law as the law
of rules. But the institutions and practices of the trial are also designed to assure that facts
are accurately determined. After all, so the argument goes, the kind of justice germane to
the trial is Aristotle’s compensatory or commutative justice, in different ways restoring
parties to an assumed legitimate status quo ante that has been disrupted by illegal action.
(Nicomachean Ethics 1131a-1132b) (Aristotle also notes in the Rhetoric, that narrative is
the form particularly germane to forensic rhetoric, as is argument to political rhetoric.
[Rhetoric 1414b]) There can be no vindication of the rights embedded in that status quo
unless the judge or jury can apply the preexistent rules to the facts as they occurred. If a
judge or jury is either indifferent to accurate fact-finding, or unable to find facts accurately,
there can be no legal vindication of rights and so no rule of law. (Extreme fact-skepticism
undermines the possibility of the rule of law.) And so many of the devices of the trial are
thought to enhance accurate fact finding by assuring that the evidence presented is
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sufficiently reliable to depend on in an important matter. This is the justification for the
rules (as it turns out, shot through with exceptions) requiring the originals of documents,
proof of the authenticity of physical evidence, and forbidding hearsay testimony.

This view of the trial is powerful, but partial. It is powerful for a number of
reasons. First, as I mentioned, it connects up with important norms of liberal legality.
Second, it is actually consistent with much of what we do at trial. It is, as we have seen,
the dominant philosophy embedded in the “rationalist tradition” in the law of evidence. It
explains the strange and artificial rules that control the direct examination of witnesses,
where testimony is elicited through nonleading questions “in the language of perception,”
that is, in a language artificially stripped (to the extent feasible) of opinions, conclusions,
interpretations, and evaluations. (It took a while for evidence writers who were educated
to empiricism to concede that perceptions were inevitably “theory-laden.”)

Testimony in

the language of perception, in the view of the architects of the common law trial, serves
both the normative and factual ideals animating the trial. It assures that the witnesses may
not surreptitiously inject their own norms into the evidence, compromising the rule of law
and it offers the jury the witness’s perceptions, not those opinions and conclusions that
were more likely to be the “anxious, usually self-preoccupied, falsifying veil,” in Iris
Murdock’s famous phrase, that we have ourselves fabricated. (Murdoch 1991: 83). If the
received view of the trial reflects our “considered judgments of justice,” then it has a claim
on our allegiance and, when brought into “reflective equilibrium” with more abstract
principles, additionally should play a role in even more theoretical accounts of what justice
is. (Rawls 1971: 579)
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So then, the received view conceives the trial an institutional device for deciding
cases by stamping legal rules on an accurate account of past events presented in a form
utterly plastic to those rules, a kind of normative “prime matter.” This has sometimes
been described as a “bureaucratic” notion of the trial. The rules, which in the positivist
version have a legitimacy based on their source in popular will, fully pre-exist the trial and
fully determine the outcome. (It recalls Thrasymachus’ view of rhetoric as the fully
instrumental means for achieving the will of the stronger man’s fully pre-existing desires,
where rhetorical power is itself an instance of strength.) In its relatively benign
contemporary manifestation, it is an instrument for effecting popular will.

The Trial and the Narratives of the Life-World
The received view is a very partial view of the trial, a kind of “misplaced
concreteness” read off the law of evidence. What more the trial is emerges from a thick
description of what we actually do at trial, in particular, an account of the distinctive forms
of trial narratives and the severe dramatic tensions that the trial’s “consciously structured
hybrid of languages” creates. (I have argued that the tasks of an adequate philosophy of
law will suggest that the line between philosophy and both anthropology and rhetorical
studies will tend to blur. [Burns 2009a: 232]) And so my argument is largely carried by
my description of the trial’s elements, and I can only provide that in barest outline here.
Let me start with the conclusions of this descriptive effort.
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It turns out that the trial is not really a device for law enforcement in a bureaucratic
sense at all. It is rather a forum within which “true law,” is discovered or revealed or
realized in and through the tensions created by the trial’s “consciously structured hybrid of
languages and practices.” It proceeds through the construction and deconstruction of
different sorts of highly constrained narratives in a dramatic medium. What notion of law
is in play here? It’s the one which James White has characterized as “an old fashioned
notion of law,” one where law is realized only through the dialogic tensions through which
it is constituted. (White 2011)

American trials begin with the opening statements of the parties. (In criminal
cases, the state is generally treated simply as one of the parties at trial.) Opening statements
are narratives. They tell a full “God’s eye” story of the events, a “vivid continuous
dream,” woven of a double helix of norms. The two strands are (1) the norms embedded in
the law of rules and (2) the norms embedded in the life-world of the judge or jury. (For
ease of reference, I will call the trier of fact “the jury.”) In American trials the parties
initially define “what this case is about,” the “as-structure,” to use hermeneutical language,
through which the jury is invited to interpret the inevitably underdetermining evidence to
follow. (This is in contrast to most European countries, where the judge’s questions tend
to “frame” the case. [Damaska 1986]) Empirical investigators have found that it is through
these narratives that the jurors organize the vast amounts of information that come to the
jury in the course of the trial. We have a natural “predisposition to organize experience
into a narrative form into plot structures and the rest.” (Bruner 1990: 47). Mercifully,
these stories are not simply artifices imposed on a wholly resistant substrate; rather
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narratives are “found …in the midst of experience and action, not in some higher level
linguistic construction or reconstruction” and “are told in being lived, and lived in being
told.” (Carr 1986). As Alastair MacIntyre has argued, any attempt to understand a human
action (and all trials are about human actions) “in themselves” and before, so to speak, the
employment of narrative categories will yield only “the disjointed parts of some possible
narrative.” (MacIntyre 1984: 212-3). It will turn out that the ability of the trial to converge
on a just decisions has a great deal to do about the way in which narratives, refined and
disciplined by the devices of the trial, cut at the joints of a human action.

One of the strands in the double helix around such a narrative is built is the
common-sense morality of the life-world. The internal morality of narrative is thus highly
contextual, not an “abstract computational morality,” in Hampshire’s terms. It is, as
Ricoeur argued, an “ethics already realized” in the life world. It can draw on all the
subtlety for the understanding of human action that the culture’s common sense can
provide. These stories can manifest or “show” what cannot otherwise be said. “We
narrate stories in order to make manifest whatever unsayable meaning resides in them.”
(Luban 1994: 201). Most stories are internally related to questions of justice and an
important story schema—legitimate status quo, disruption of the status quo, and often
difficult restoration—places jurors within the structure of commutative justice and reminds
them of their practical task. The story is over only when the jury’s verdict finishes it.
And, as trial lawyers like to say, part of the goal of an effective opening state is to persuade
the jury to want to rule for your client by an appeal to feelings as well as logic. And this is
to the good:
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Emotions can sometimes mislead and distort judgment; Aristotle is aware
of this. But they can also…give us access to a truer and deeper level of
ourselves, to values and commitments that have been concealed by
defensive ambition or rationalization.
But even this is, so far, too Platonic a line to take: for it suggests that
emotion is valuable only as an instrumental means to a purely intellectual
state. We know, however, that for Aristotle appropriate responses…can,
like good intellectual responses, help to constitute the refined “perception”
which is the best sort of human judgment. (Nussbaum 1986: 390)

In the United States this “legitimacy” of the jury’s life-world norms has deep historical
roots in Federalist concepts of the popular sovereignty and Antifederalist notions,
embedded in the Bill of Rights, that the jury retains some of a primordial sovereignty to
continuously reevaluate the work of the “magistrates” in all three branches who always
threaten “true law.” (Wood 1969; Amar 1998: 94-103)

At trial, the first opening statement is followed by a second. The second portrays
the case as about something else and begins the battle for the imagination of the jury. Trial
lawyers are inclined to say with a only a bit of exaggeration, “Every fact has two faces.”
Because the whole is understood in light of the part and the part in light of the whole, the
relative meaning and plausibility of each of the pieces of evidence offered depends on the
overall plausibility of each of the opening statements. This plausibility is determined by
internal narrative norms, such as coherence, by consistency with empirical common sense
generalizations, and, more pragmatically, with the relative importance of the norms it
evokes and the attractiveness of the course of action in which it invites the jury to engage.
(Thus the trial’s holism is not merely theoretical, but also practical.) The jury is thus
engaged in an act of theory choice where the evidence is largely theory-laden and the
process of decision making is both circular and practical.
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The opening statements relativize each other and dramatize the gap between the
performing of a human action and the telling of it. The two-story schema of the trial also
mirrors an aspect of ordinary moral experience, again to cite Hampshire, where we
oscillate back and forth between two ways of describing a possible action, where one way
approve of what we are considering and the other condemns it. The competing stories
begin the process of resistance to the “aestheticizing of the moral” that students of
narrative have warned us against. After all, the teller of the better story should not
necessarily be the winner of the trial. And each of the trial lawyers must be aware that the
story he or she tells will be evaluated, though deferentially, by the judge to determine
whether the truth of the story would entitle the story-teller, as a matter of the law of rules,
to prevail. Except as against the defendant in a criminal case (where self-consciously
political judgments take this authority away from the judge), the judge may rule that “as a
matter of law” the narrative does not warrant success, ruling in effect, “if that is what you
say occurred, you are not entitled to prevail.” The background of the law of rules is one of
the constraining agencies on trial narrative. The law of rules remains the second of the
strands in the advocate’s double helix.

The opening statements are not only stories. They have a performative dimension:
they are promises. They are promises made to the human beings on the jury to produce
evidence to support each of the more highly characterized and value-laden assertions
made. This creates another of the most important defining tensions that occurs at trial. To
invoke one of the rhetorical commonplaces frequently heard in closing argument, a trial
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lawyer who fails to produce credible evidence to support the story he tells in opening
statement has “broken his promise” and deliberately frustrated the jury in its sworn task.

Most of the trial is consumed with witness testimony. Testimony comes to the jury
through the direct examination of witnesses. We have already seen the received view’s
understanding of the highly artificial structure of direct examination, an understanding that
has some force. But those canons serve other functions at trial as well, normative and
“factual.” The life-world norms around which the narratives of opening statement are
woven are inevitably over-generalized. They are prejudgments (“prejudices”) about likely
occurrences and their likely evaluations. The obsessive perceptual detail of direct
examination serves not only to provide reliable bases for factual inference, but also serves
to refine the norms for common-sense judgment. They force the jury to determine the
reach of those norms in ways that “pre-existent” common sense never has. For example, in
ways that outrun doctrinal elaboration, the trial of a contract case may force the jury to
decide whether the norms surrounding promise-keeping really extend to the detailed
factual pattern that emerges at trial. Opening statements have presented to the jury
“diplomatic” accounts by trial diplomats which attempt to account for, to be fair to, all of
the norms what inhabit the life-world and the law of rules. Witnesses, even well-prepared
witnesses are, mercifully, unlikely to be so diplomatic and the personal accounts that they
give relatively indifferent to the more coherent accounts given in opening statements. (By
the end of trial, both lawyers will understand that any opening statement is likely to have
been at least a bit too coherent for the “booming, buzzing confusion” that William James
found in the world.) The trial thus serves as a critique of common sense morality.
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But the Spartan narratives of direct examination have, in contrast to opening
statements, more epistemological significances as well. This is because of the structure of
common sense inference. Recall that every bit of evidence offered will be linked to a
material fact by an empirical generalization that forms part of our web of belief. For
example, in evaluating a romantically disappointed defendant’s motive to engage in a
violent act against his former lover, the jury may begin with a common sense
generalization such as, “Generally and for the most part, rejected lovers experience
powerful negative emotions toward the person who rejected them.” The defense will
counter with a qualifying generalization, such as “….but not where the person rejected has
another romantic interest who is requiting his love…” You can see that this process of
qualification that tests the extension of every common sense generalization in the web of
belief could go on almost to infinity:
The jury will necessarily ask implicitly, “How universal is the
commonsense generalization that links the circumstantial evidence to the
episode in the bare narrative for which it is offered as proof?” Since the
structure of the commonsense generalizations that provide those links is
always, “Generally and for the most part…” the next question is always
“Are all the particular additional facts in this case (F2…..Fn) such as to
make the generalization more or less powerful than it would be, all other
things being equal?” But the existence of these latter facts (F2…..Fn) and
their proper characterizations will themselves be in dispute just as is F1.
And the strength of the commonsense generalizations that link those facts to
what the proponent seeks to show is also caught in another web of mutually
determining probabilities. (Burns 1999: 190, edited)
This account tends to suggest a “coherence” theory of the kind of truth that is available at
trial. (However, although it is a pudding, to borrow from Henry James description of the
novel, it is a lumpy pudding: some of the bits of evidence may resist recharacterization in
one of the two theories offered and so support the alternative.) The extent to which trial
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narratives can reveal the “truth of what is,” in Gadamer’s words, the meaning of what
occurred, depends on the ability of hermeneutical modes of thought to converge on
something that may fairly be called a “practical truth.” (Burns 1999: 233-35) The quoted
paragraph speaks of a “bare narrative,” an account in the language of perception of “what
happened.” That kind of narrative, is, as we have seen, only one kind of narrative at play
in the trial and answers only one kind of question: “What would you have seen had you
been there?” But there are other forms of narrative and they seek to answer other
questions: How shall we best characterize those events? How shall we interpret their
meaning? How shall we evaluate the actions underlying them? (How shall we allocate
Aristotle’s “praise and blame?”) What will judging this action this way or that say about
our moral identity, who we are? (Taylor 1990: 3-53) Which legal category best comprises
these actions and events (to give the received view its due)? And then there are more
specifically political questions: “What does deciding this case one way or another say
about our political identity and what kind of a political society ought we to be?” In ways I
cannot describe here, the narratives of the trial can address each of these questions. In any
given trial, one or other may be the most important question, though it is up to the jury to
make this determination of relative importance which literally decides the case.

There are also deconstructive devices at play in the trial. Cross-examination serves
to deconstruct or disrupt the meaningful narrative of direct examination. Cross may
construct a competing narrative to the one the witness has told, may reveal facts omitted
from an artful direct examination that are broadly “incoherent” with the meaning the direct
examiner sought to convey (that change its meaning or challenge its plausibility). Cross
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may manifest aspects of the witness’s character important to the underlying events on trial,
and which, in many different ways, undermining the credibility of the witness herself.
Finally, closing argument contains any number of rhetorical devices, on the one hand to
support the original interpretation of the events embedded in the opening statement and, on
the other, to argue that the evidence presented simply cannot be assimilated to the
opposing theory (the pudding is too lumpy for that proposed interpretation). All of this
serves, in a well-tried case, to converge on a truth beyond story-telling. Just as art can
achieve a truth beyond the ineffable.

These narrative engagements occur under circumstances so obvious that their
significance is easy to miss. (“What is closest to us is hardest to see….”) The semiotic of
the trial elevates the importance of the concrete and specific aspects of the case and
discourages easy generalizations; it allows the witnesses only the representational function
of language (usually no performatives such as promising or urging); the lawyers are given
license to be astoundingly intrusive so long as topics are relevant; it progressives through
time (something intrinsic to drama) so that for a moment, every piece of evidence may be
the privileged lens through which to see all the rest of the evidence; the trial is temporally
compressed (in sharp contrast with many European proceedings) so as to emphasize
interpretive unities of theory and theme; it consists of a rhythm between continuous
speech and interruption with conflicting perspectives; as American judges do not comment
substantively on the case and never tell an “official” story, it presents a true polyphony of
perspectives which is not resolved save by the verdict itself.
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The Trial as Drama
This process of narrative construction and deconstruction occurs in a medium that
can only be called dramatic. It is an oral medium where real persons speak sometimes to
the jury and sometimes to each other. Thomas Green, in his magisterial account of the
history of the English jury trial, Verdict According to Conscience, argued that the face-toface nature of the trial has always served to remind the participants that the proceeding was
somehow about justice. Because the trial is a performance, the jury may judge in a direct,
“prepredicative” way, whether a particular story or a particular argument “rings true.” The
jury may dwell in the confrontations that occur between judge and lawyer, lawyer and
lawyer, lawyer and witness. Listening involves a “turning to the Other. An epistemology
of listening compels us toward dialogue rather than detachment.” (O’Fallon & Ryan 1990:
896-97) In listening “[i]n a certain sense we have to become the other person; or rather,
we let him become part of us for a brief second. We suspend our own identities, after
which we come back to ourselves and accept or reject what he has said” (Hibbitts 1994:
344). But the listening at trial occurs from a rather formal special distance, dramatizing
both requirements for the doing of justice, “sympathy and detachment.” (Beiner 1984:
102) Drama qualifies the hegemony of generalities, giving “a more urgent reality to the
particular acts that establish distance between a given case and general rule or that expose
a given case to competing rules…” (Ball 1981: 61) As Bentley said about the theater, “the
little ritual of performance, given just a modicum of competence, can lend to the events
represented another dimension, a more urgent reality.” (Bentley 1997: 207)
Dramatizations serve to “extricate the their subject matter from that which is considered to
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be inessential to it and simultaneously reveal that which is most significant,” which
Gadamer calls “the truth of what is.” (Warnke 1987: 58). In short:
The dramatic form of the trial deepens the general tension between
involvement and distance distinctive to the trial as oral communication… It
allows for some sympathetic identification by those aspects of common
sense invoked in different ways by each lawyer, while distancing the
audience from each vision, in order to allow some limited transcendence of
commonsense judgment. (Burns 1999: 138, notes omitted).

There is much more that could be said, but I will stop. The American trial is one of
the great achievements of our public culture. By dramatizing some of the most demanding
conflicts which constitute our common lives, it allows us to do what we American
(post)moderns need to do, “less to create constantly new forms of life than to creatively
renew actual forms by taking advantage of their internal multiplicity and tensions with one
another.” (Kolb 1986: 259)

Bibiliography
Amar, Akhil Reed. The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998).
Ball, Milner S. The Promise of American Law (Athens: University of George Press, 1981).
Beiner, Ronald. Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
Bentley, Eric. The Threatre of Commitment and Other Essays on Drama in Our Society
(New York: Atheneum, 1967).
Bruner, Jerome. Acts of Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
Burns, Robert P. The Death of the American Trial (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009).
_____________. “The Tasks of a Philosophy of Law,” in On Philosophy in American Law,
ed. Francis J. Mootz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009b): 232-38.

14

_____________. A Theory of the Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
Carr, David. Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1986).
Damaska, Mirjan R. The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to
the Legeal Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
Hart, H.L.A., Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
Hibbits, Bernard. “Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse,” Cardozo Law Review 16 (1994): 229.
Kolb, David, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986).
Luban, David. Legal Modernism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1984).
Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 1991).
Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
O’Fallon, James M. & Ryan, Cheyney C. “Finding a Voice, Giving an Ear: Reflections on
Masters/Slaves, Men/Women,” Georgia Law Review 24 (1990): 883, 896-97.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Harvard Univerity Press, 1990).
Warnke, George, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1987).
White, James Boyd, “An Old-Fashioned View of Law,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol.
12, no. 1 (2011), 381.
Wood, Gordon S. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

15

